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作者:帝宗杜
来源:怒火攻心
发布时间:2026-08-26

护士小葵

芯片杠杆ETF暴跌七成依旧吸金!华尔街感慨:这不是投资 是豪赌_我的网站

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A |       业内数据显示,尽管7月和8月期间追踪半导体公司的高风险杠杆基金遭受了重创,但投资者仍向这些基金注入了数十亿美元,试图提前布局以博取该行业的潜在反弹机会。    

Tian Xuan Photo: Courtesy of Tian
    Tian Xuan Photo: Courtesy of Tian
In economic theory, "overcapacity" - for which no universally accepted definition exists - is inherently a recurring feature of the market economy's dynamic "balance - imbalance - rebalance" cycle. The Western narrative that equates China's sizable production capacity directly with "overcapacity" defies economic logic and rigor; in reality, it represents a politicization of trade and economic issues.
First, it confuses the concepts of "capacity scale" and "overcapacity." China's overall industrial capacity utilization remains within a reasonable range. Periodically lower utilization in traditional sectors reflects a normal adjustment as these industries advance toward high-end, intelligent, and green production. Ample capacity in certain emerging industries is precisely what meets surging global demand for high-end, smart, and green solutions. Therefore, equating scale with excess is typical equivocation.
Second, "overcapacity" itself is a dynamic feature of market economies, where no fixed balance persists indefinitely. Judging capacity based solely on static snapshots violates basic economic principles.
Third, it is erroneous to simplistically link trade surpluses or industrial subsidies to overcapacity, while ignoring the macro context of global specialization and cross-border savings-investment structures. It also disregards the reality that reasonable capacity utilization ranges differ across economies at varying stages of development. Imposing a single standard on China is neither scientific nor rigorous.
China's global competitiveness in green technology stems from sustained, large-scale investment in innovation, a comprehensive industrial and supply chain system, massive application scenarios, and intense market competition - not from alleged government subsidies. After decades of long-cycle R&D, Chinese industries have achieved breakthroughs in core technologies such as power batteries and photovoltaic modules.
During the 14th Five-Year Plan period (2021-25), China's nationwide R&D spending grew at an average annual rate of 10 percent. Economies of scale have continuously diluted production costs. China's ultra-large domestic market and full-chain supporting ecosystem provide an optimal testing ground for new technologies - from pilot verification to mass deployment. With more than 200 million market entities driving fierce competition, enterprises are constantly compelled to cut costs, raise efficiency, and upgrade products, thereby forging dual advantages in price and performance that we see today.
There is no direct causation between subsidies and overcapacity. Industrial subsidies are a globally recognized practice, typically aimed at correcting market failures and advancing critical technologies. China's subsidies are granted on an impartial basis to all types of market entities, in full compliance with WTO rules, and have not triggered disorderly capacity expansion.
Currently, capacity utilization in China's green industries remains within a reasonable range. Support is primarily directed toward R&D, technological breakthroughs, and consumer-side incentives through market-based mechanisms - not toward fueling overcapacity. Crucially, China's high-quality capacity has reduced the global cost of green transition, representing an opportunity rather than a shock to world development.
Against the backdrop of global carbon neutrality goals, labeling China's new energy capacity as "overcapacity" is entirely untenable. According to the International Energy Agency, global data center electricity consumption will approach 1 trillion kWh by 2030, with 40 percent of incremental power needing to come from renewables. Demand for wind power, photovoltaics, power batteries, and related green energy solutions remains far from saturated - so claims of "overcapacity" are groundless.
China's capacity plays a central role in advancing the global energy transition. Over the past decade, the levelized cost of electricity from wind and solar globally has fallen by more than 60 percent and 80 percent respectively - improvements largely attributable to Chinese innovation and manufacturing, which have directly lowered the cost threshold for worldwide green transformation.
The US journal Science crowned the global renewable energy surge led by China among its Top 10 Breakthroughs of 2025. Leveraging its technological and scale advantages, China is well positioned to supply abundant, high-quality green energy equipment and solutions, meet fast-growing renewable demand from data centers, industrial production, and other sectors, and tangibly support countries in implementing the Paris Agreement. In short, China is a pivotal force driving the global low-carbon transition.
The so-called "China Shock 2.0" is fundamentally a protectionist narrative rooted in Cold War thinking - a politically motivated claim inconsistent with facts. The rapid development of China's modern industries is driven by innovation and sustained institutional reform, not by dumping allegedly excess capacity abroad. Rather than posing a shock, China's industrial progress offers a "China Opportunity 2.0." It delivers multiple dividends to global development - innovation dividends, market dividends, and growth dividends - while injecting stability and vitality into global industrial chains through an open and win-win approach.
China's high-quality green and high-tech exports have tangibly accelerated the global green transition and reduced production costs worldwide. Meanwhile, as the world's largest goods consumption market and the second-largest importer for 17 consecutive years, China provides enormous market opportunities for economies around the globe. Moreover, China's open-source collaboration and technology sharing in frontier fields such as artificial intelligence and the digital economy enable developing countries to bridge the digital divide at lower cost and share in the benefits of the technological revolution.
The facts demonstrate that China's emerging technologies and products represent a "China Opportunity 2.0" - driving global technological progress, accelerating the green transition, improving livelihoods across nations, and bolstering the industrialization of developing economies. This open and mutually beneficial cooperation stands as the true engine of global economic recovery and sustainable development. 
This article is compiled based on an interview with Tian Xuan, dean at the Guanghua School of Management and Boya Distinguished Professor of Finance of Peking University. [email protected]

。  据晨星的数据显示,追踪芯片股的最大杠杆ETF——Direxion Daily Semiconductor Bull 3X Shares,在7月和8月前两周吸引了近70亿美元的资金净流入。  该杠杆ETF提供对纽约证券交易所半导体指数的三倍杠杆投资,该指数涵盖30家美国芯片公司。在此期间,尽管标的指数从高点仅回撤了20%出头,但该杠杆基金的跌幅却高达70%。  除了指数型杠杆ETF外,追踪芯片制造商SK海力士和闪迪的单只股票杠杆基金,在芯片股暴跌期间及之后也吸引了可观的资金流入。  以南方东英(CSOP Asset Management)旗下提供韩国芯片巨头SK海力士每日2倍回报的港股基金为例:在该股票单日振幅屡屡突破10%的剧烈波动期,该基金虽然经历了一波高达86%的深幅回撤,却依然在过去六周内吸金超10亿美元。  同期,投资者还向一只追踪闪迪的杠杆ETF净投入了3.5亿美元。这家美国存储芯片公司仅在7月份就暴跌了46%,而该产品从6月的最高点到7月的最低点的跌幅也一度达到85%。  不惧“接飞刀”  高盛美国股票策略师Ben Snider表示,“逢低买入、逢高卖出”已成为许多杠杆ETF投资者的主流操作策略,即市场越跌越买,等股价反弹时再获利了结。  杠杆ETF利用衍生品放大回报,在散户投资者中尤其受欢迎——这些投资者希望在由超大规模科技公司投入数千亿美元建设基础设施所推动的人工智能热潮中提升收益。  作为本轮投资狂潮的核心受益者,全球半导体股票此前一路飙升,但在今年夏天因市场担忧AI狂潮的可持续性及盈利前景而大幅回调,进而导致跟踪该板块的杠杆基金陷入惨重亏损。  然而,部分投资者将此次抛售视为买入良机,寄望于股价反弹。  对此,巴克莱衍生品研究主管Anshul Gupta警示道:“我们屡次强调,流入杠杆ETF的资金呈现出极其明显的‘逢低买入’特征。但在这种行情下接刀子,无异于盲目抄底。”  在这轮暴跌中,韩国散户受创尤甚。

B | 杠杆产品在韩国风靡一时,但也因显著加剧了单股及大盘的波动而饱受诟病。高盛估计,仅在7月中旬,韩国就有超过120万个散户杠杆账户被迫触发了追加保证金通知。

C | 为此,韩国监管机构紧急出台了新规,不仅对个人的风险敞口设定了上限,还强制要求投资者在交易单股杠杆基金前必须完成为期一周的培训课程。  不过,从源源不断的资金流入来看,即便监管政策大幅收紧,依然阻挡不了众多散户押注高风险产品的热情。  M&G股票首席投资官Fabiana Fedeli表达了她的担忧:“市场泡沫或许已被挤出了一大部分,但投资者的投机行为根本没有改变。

D | 这令人深感不安。”她补充道:“我们看到多国监管机构已开始介入调查这类产品……但就目前来看,这些干预手段的成效依然微乎其微。

E | ”  当然,并非所有杠杆产品都在疯狂吸金。自7月芯片股抛售潮开启以来,跟踪英伟达和美光等美国芯片巨头的热门杠杆ETF就遭遇了数亿美元的资金撤离。

F |   惨烈夏天  Kepler Cheuvreux研究部ETF咨询主管Inès Barahhou形象地表示,这个夏天对单只股票杠杆及反向ETF投资者而言是一场“残酷的折磨”——过去12个月中,已有43只相关基金的跌幅超过了90%。  受重创的产品涵盖了与英特尔、ASML、台积电、AMD、SK海力士、闪迪等AI及半导体巨头挂钩的ETF,甚至连MicroStrategy和Coinbase等加密概念股的相关基金也未能幸免。  Barahhou还指出,今年单只股票杠杆基金的清盘退市数量已创下122只的历史新高,远超2023年全年98只的纪录,其中仅与MicroStrategy一家公司挂钩的清盘基金就有5只。  “我们在8月经历了极其剧烈的市场波动,”Barahhou总结道,“在剧烈动荡的行情里持有杠杆ETF就是一场灾难,你会亏得血本无归。这根本不是投资,纯粹是豪赌。”  然而,发行商的推新热情依然高涨。根据Kepler Cheuvreux旗下Trackinsight的数据,截至8月12日,今年新成立的杠杆ETF已达303只——极为接近2025年创下的324只的历史峰值。  “一种全新的商业模式正在形成:发行商不断推出单只股票杠杆ETF来试水市场需求,一旦发现吸金不达预期,便会迅速将其清盘,并无缝切换至下一个热点。”Barahhou补充道,“这类产品的管理费极高,哪怕新发基金中只有20%能跑出来,这种商业模式依然可行。”(文章来源:财联社)。

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